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Abstract—This paper investigates the impacts of competition
in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a
network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal
strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly
and duopoly markets, including the optimal prices of rides.
Furthermore, we characterize the platform operator’s profits and
the consumer surplus. We show that for the duopoly, the optimal
equilibrium prices for rides have to be symmetric between
the firms. Then, in order to study the benefits of introducing
competition in the market, we derive universal theoretical bounds
on the ratio of prices for rides, aggregate demand served, profits
of the firms, and consumer surplus between the monopolistic and
the duopolistic setting. We discuss how consumers’ firm loyalty
affects each of the aforementioned metrics. Finally, using the
Manhattan network and demand data, we quantify the efficacy
of static pricing and routing policies and compare it to real-time
model predictive policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, growing popularity of mobility-on-
demand (MoD) platforms has extensively altered the paradigm
of urban mobility [1]. Owing to the rapid evolution of enabling
technologies for autonomous driving and advancements in
eco-friendly electric vehicles (EVs), it is possible for MoD
platforms to employ self-driving electric vehicles and therefore
preserve the benefits of private automobiles while reducing the
consumption of non-renewable energy resources. Given this,
the vision of an electric and autonomous mobility-on-demand
(AMoD) fleet serving urban customers’ mobility needs is gain-
ing traction within the transportation industry, with multiple
companies now heavily investing in AMoD technology [2].
Unlike modern ride-sharing platforms that establish a two-
sided market between drivers and customers such as Uber
and Lyft and rely only on pricing schemes to manage the
demand-supply balance, self-driving technology allows AMoD
systems to operate in a single-sided market in which the
customers are directly served by the platform operator rather
than the drivers. This allows the platforms to centrally manage
their fleets of vehicles and hence efficiently dispatch them
to where they are needed the most without the need to
incentivize drivers, including rebalancing the idle passenger-
free vehicles throughout the network to match supply and
demand. Furthermore, autonomous vehicles can better exploit
diversity in electricity prices for cheaper operation.
In this paper, we study the effects of competition in electric
AMoD systems that are operated by profit-maximizing plat-
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form operators. Owing to the opportunities that autonomous
electric vehicles create for efficient control schemes and cost-
effective operation, it is possible for a single platform operator
to provide cheap rides through optimizing the prices of rides
for geographical load balancing as well as optimally routing
and charging the fleet of electric vehicles. However, a mo-
nopolistic market with a single AMoD provider is in general
disadvantageous for customer welfare. Therefore, introduction
of another AMoD service provider to the market results in
firms competing over the customers, hence forcing them to
charge fairer prices and provide a higher quality of service.
Our primary goal is to investigate the optimal behaviour of the
firms in a monopoly and duopoly and quantify the impacts of
competition on the customers as well as the firms.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We formalize the platform operator’s profit maximization
problem by adopting a static network-flow based model
that captures the characteristics of an AMoD fleet, and
derive expressions for the ride prices, profits, and con-
sumer surplus under the optimal static policy.
• We prove that if the competitors have identical costs, then
the duopoly equilibrium prices have to be symmetric. We
show that under a mild sufficient condition on maximum
travel costs that can be met with electric vehicles, the
optimal duopoly prices in equilibrium are never larger
than the optimal monopoly prices. Furthermore, we de-
rive theoretical bounds for the ratio of prices, induced
demand, profits, and consumer surplus in the monopoly
and the duopoly equilibrium.
• We highlight a sufficient condition that characterizes
the family of policies that guarantee stability of the
system in a real environment based on the optimal
static policy. Moreover, we study a real-time pricing and
fleet management policy using model predictive control,
and demonstrate the performance numerically using real
network and demand data.
Related work: Research on AMoD systems concentrates on
optimal fleet control, with a particular focus on rebalancing.
Scholars have tackled the rebalancing problem using queueing
theoretical [3], fluidic [4], network flow [5], and Markovian
models [6]. These works develop time-invariant policies by re-
lying on the steady-state of the system, which may not be able
to address real-world challenges such as variability in customer
arrivals or integrality requirements in real-time dispatch. As
a consequence, studies aiming to develop efficient real-time
control policies using model predictive control (MPC) have
emerged in the literature, e.g., [7]–[11]. The authors of [8], [9]
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2design a data-driven MPC algorithm by predicting the future
demand, whereas the authors of [10] develop a stochastic MPC
algorithm that leverages uncertain travel demand forecasts.
In [7], the authors also consider a fleet of EVs and hence
propose an MPC approach that optimizes vehicle routing and
scheduling subject to energy constraints. A recent work [11]
devises an algorithm that aims to optimally route the fleet in
coordination with public transit. None of these studies however
adopt a price-responsive demand model and exploit pricing to
further optimize the system. Lately, benefits of joint pricing
and rebalancing in AMoD systems have been demonstrated
using macroscopic steady-state models [12], [13] as well as
microscopic dynamic models [13].
Research on competition in ride-sharing markets is also
relevant to ours. In terms of a broader scope on platform
competition in two-sided markets, [14] and [15] introduce gen-
eral frameworks and provide in-depth analysis. The impacts
of single/multi-homing users on the market equilibria have
been investigated in [16]–[18]. Theoretical studies on dynamic
platform competition [19]–[21] and spatial platform competi-
tion [22], [23] in two sided markets further provide insights
towards competition in ride-sharing markets. To complement
these theoretical works, [24] implements simulations focusing
on pricing schemes and information sharing in competitive
ride-sharing markets. Besides these, scholars examine the
competition between ride-sharing and taxis [25]–[29], where
Uber is considered to be a monopoly for ride-sharing services.
These works however do not capture the competition among
ride-sharing platforms, yet ride-sharing markets are rather
oligopolies in many countries [30]. Accordingly, a recent work
[31] presents a head-to-head comparison of Uber, Lyft, and
taxis using statistical methods. Another line of work related
to ours focuses on the benefits of spatial price discrimination
[32] and dynamic pricing in ride-sharing networks [33], [34].
These however do not study a competitive market. Closest to
our work is [35], which studies the effects of thickness (i.e.,
the mass of drivers) and competition on the equilibria of ride-
sharing markets. It shows that competition always increases
the welfare of the drivers, whereas it decreases the welfare of
the customers if the market is not sufficiently thick.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work
on competition in electric AMoD systems. We aim to form
the bridge between AMoD and competition literature with our
theoretical findings. The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and
define the platform operator’s optimization problem. In Section
III, we discuss the static planning problems for both the
monopoly and the symmetric duopoly, and derive closed-
form bounds for the effects of competition. In Section IV, we
discuss the challenges of the real-world and real-time control
policies. In Section V, we present the numerical experiments
demonstrating the effects of competition as well as the efficacy
of the real-time control policies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Network and Demand Models: We consider two fleets of
AMoD EVs operated by two competitors within a trans-
portation network characterized by a fully connected graph
(a) Duopoly demand functions (b) Monopoly demand function
Fig. 1: Graphical illustration of the demand functions for (a) duopoly,
and (b) monopoly. In duopoly, the line σx + (1 − σ)y = `1ij
corresponds to the customers who earn 0 pay-off buying a ride from
firm 1, and the line σx+(1−σ)(`max−y) = `2ij corresponds to the
customers who earn 0 pay-off buying a ride from firm 2. As such,
for the price tuple (`1ij , `
2
ij), the blue shaded area corresponds to the
customers for firm 1, whereas the red corresponds to the customers
for firm 2. Monopoly is the special case of duopoly, where the prices
for rides set by firm 2 are set to infinity: `2ij =∞.
consisting of M = {1, . . . ,m} nodes. Each of these nodes
can serve as a trip origin or destination.
We study a discrete-time system with time periods nor-
malized to integral units t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. In each pe-
riod, potential riders of mass θij seek rides between origin-
destination (OD) pair (i, j), where θii = 0. We assume that
customers have different valuations for riding with each firm,
represented by the tuple (v1, v2) where vf is the customer’s
valuation for firm f . To capture customer heterogeneity, we let
(v1, v2) ∼ V , where V denotes the PDF of the joint distribution
with support [0, `max]2. Here, `max is the maximum valuation
of the customers for both firms, i.e. the maximum willingness
to pay1. To characterize the distribution V , we adopt the
model proposed by [35] and assume that the distribution of
the random variables (v1, v2) is defined implicitly through:
v1 = σx+ (1− σ)y, (1)
v2 = σx+ (1− σ)(`max − y), (2)
where x and y are iid uniform random variables with support
[0, `max] and σ ∈ (0, 1). We refer to x as the common value
component and y as the idiosyncratic component, with σ
as the measure of correlation over customers’ preferences.
A customer with valuations (v1, v2) makes a decision upon
observing the prices for rides. In particular, if the prices for
rides between OD pair (i, j) in period are set to be `1ij and
`2ij by firm 1 and 2, respectively, the customer buys a ride
from firm f if vf − `fij > 0 and vf − `fij > v−f − `−fij (given
firm f , −f denotes the other firm), i.e., the customer gains
a positive pay-off for purchasing a ride from firm f and this
pay-off is higher than the pay-off that the customer would gain
by buying from the other firm. Otherwise they do not buy a
ride from either of the firms and leave the system. Hence, for
a price tuple (`1ij , `
2
ij) for OD pair (i, j), the induced mass of
1For brevity of notation, we uniformly set `max to be the maximum
willingness to pay for all OD pairs without loss of generality. Our results
can be derived in a similar fashion by replacing `max with `
ij
max, where
`ijmax is the maximum willingness to pay for OD pair (i, j).
3arrivals for firm f is given by Θfij := θijD(`
f
ij , `
−f
ij ), where
D : [0, `max]
2 → [0, 1] is the demand function of customers
which determines the fraction of customers that would buy a
ride from firm f upon observing the prices. This function has
a simple geometric interpretation depicted in Figure 1.
Vehicle Model: In order to best serve its customers and
maximize its profits, each operator needs to dispatch its fleet,
including vehicle routing and charging. To implicitly capture
the effect of trip demand and the associated charging and
routing decisions on the fleet size and hence the operational
costs incurred by each operator, we assume that each vehicle
in charging or trip-making mode has a per period operational
cost of βc and βt, respectively. A trip-making vehicle can
either be occupied by a customer, which we refer to as a
customer carrying vehicle; or can be empty, which we refer
to as a rebalancing vehicle. Furthermore, as the vehicles are
electric, they have to sustain charge in order to operate, which
needs to be purchased from the power grid. Without loss of
generality, we assume there is a charging station placed at each
node i ∈M. To charge at node i, the operator pays a price of
electricity pi per unit of energy. We assume that all EVs in the
fleet have a battery capacity denoted as emax ∈ Z+; therefore,
each EV has a discrete battery energy level e ∈ E , where
E = {e ∈ N|0 ≤ e ≤ emax}. In our discrete-time model, we
assume each vehicle takes one period to charge one unit of
energy and τij periods to travel between OD pair (i, j), while
consuming eij units of energy.
Platform Operator’s Problem: We consider a profit-
maximizing AMoD operator that manages a fleet of EVs that
make trips to provide transportation services to customers. The
operator’s goal is to maximize profits by 1) setting prices for
rides and hence managing customer demand at each node; 2)
optimally operating the AMoD fleet (i.e., charging and routing)
to minimize operational and charging costs. Next, we study the
static planning problem for both the monopoly and the duopoly
settings in order to characterize the optimal static prices and to
examine the effects of competition in electric AMoD systems.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STATIC PROBLEM
In this section, we establish and discuss the static planning
problems considering a single operator (i.e., monopoly) and
two competing operators (i.e., duopoly) in order to study
the effect of competition in an electric AMoD system. We
consider the fluid scaling of the network and characterize the
static planning problem via a network flow formulation. The
static problem is convenient for determining the optimal static
pricing, routing, and charging policy of the platform operator.
A. Monopoly Static Planning Problem
We define the monopoly to be the setting where the firm
2 is removed. In order to make the comparison between the
monopoly and the duopoly consistent, we keep the customer
behaviour and the demand function D same. Hence, removing
firm 2 from the system is equivalent to setting prices for rides
posted by firm 2 to be ∞, and the induced demand for rides
for OD pair (i, j) to be D(`1ij ,∞) for a given `1ij .
The goal of the platform operator is to maximize its profits
by setting prices for rides and making routing and charging
decisions such that the induced demand is served and the
system is stable. Let xeij be the number of vehicles at node
i with energy level e being routed to node j and xeic be the
number of vehicles charging at node i and currently at energy
level e. We state the platform operator’s problem as follows:
max
xeic,x
e
ij ,`
1
ij
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij`
1
ijD(`
1
ij ,∞)
−
m∑
i=1
emax−1∑
e=0
(βc + pi)x
e
ic
− βt
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
emax∑
e=eij
xeijτij (3a)
subject to θijD(`1ij ,∞) ≤
emax∑
e=eij
xeij ∀i, j ∈M, (3b)
xeic +
m∑
j=1
xeij =
xe−1ic +
m∑
j=1
x
e+eji
ji ∀i ∈M, ∀e ∈ E , (3c)
xemaxic = 0 ∀i ∈M, (3d)
xeij = 0 ∀e < eij , ∀i, j ∈M, (3e)
xeic ≥ 0, xeij ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈M, ∀e ∈ E , (3f)
xeic = x
e
ij = 0 ∀e /∈ E , ∀i, j ∈M. (3g)
The first term in the objective function in (3) accounts for
the aggregate revenue the platform generates by providing
rides for θijD(`1ij ,∞) number of riders with a price of `1ij .
The second term is the operational and charging costs incurred
by the charging vehicles, and the last term is the operational
costs of the trip-making vehicles.
The constraint (3b) requires the platform to operate at least
as many vehicles to serve all the induced demand between any
two nodes i and j (The rest are the vehicles travelling without
passengers, i.e., rebalancing vehicles). We will refer to this as
the demand satisfaction constraint. The constraint (3c) is the
flow balance constraint for each node and each battery energy
level, which restricts the number of available vehicles at node
i and energy level e to be the sum of arrivals from all nodes
and vehicles that are charging with energy level e − 1. The
constraint (3d) ensures that the vehicles with full battery do
not charge further, and the constraint (3e) ensures the vehicles
sustain enough charge to travel between OD pair (i, j).
Optimal Pricing: The prices for rides are a crucial component
of the profits generated. The next proposition highlights how
the optimal prices `mij := `
1∗
ij for rides are related to the
network parameters, prices of electricity, and the operational
costs. In the following results, we investigate this intercon-
nection by providing upper bounds on the prices that a profit-
maximizing monopolist may charge customers, as well the
corresponding profits generated. We highlight the fact that
the monopolist’s profits are in fact a decreasing function of
the optimal prices for rides. The higher the monopolist has
4to charge its customers, the lower its generated profits. This
could be a motivation for the monopolist to invest in efficient
vehicle technology and cheap charging solutions.
Proposition 1. Define
λij := βt(τij + τji) + eij(pj + βc) + eji(pi + βc).
Let λmij be optimal the dual variable corresponding to the
demand satisfaction constraint for OD pair (i, j). The optimal
monopoly prices `mij are:
`mij =

λmij+
√
(λmij )
2+6σ(1−σ)`2max
3 ,
λmij
`max
< 3−5σ2
(1+σ)`max+2λ
m
ij
4 ,
3−5σ
2 ≤
λmij
`max
< 3σ−12
2λmij+`max
3 ,
3σ−1
2 ≤
λmij
`max
≤ 1.
(4)
These prices can be upper bounded by:
`mij ≤

λij+
√
(λij)2+6σ(1−σ)`2max
3 ,
λij
`max
< 3−5σ2
(1+σ)`max+2λij
4 ,
3−5σ
2 ≤ λij`max < 3σ−12
2λij+`max
3 ,
3σ−1
2 ≤ λij`max ≤ 1.
(5)
The proof can be found in Appendix A. We can interpret
the dual variables λmij as the cost of providing a single ride
between i and j to the platform. In the worst case scenario,
every single requested ride from node i requires rebalancing
and charging both at the origin and the destination. Hence
the upper bounds on (5) include the operational costs of
passenger-carrying, rebalancing and charging vehicles (both
at the origin and the destination); and the energy costs of
both passenger-carrying and rebalancing trips multiplied by
the price of electricity at the trip destinations (This is exactly
what λij consists of).
Similar to the taxes applied on products, whose burden
is shared among the supplier and the customer; the costs
associated with rides are shared among the platform operator
and the riders (which is why the price paid by the riders
include some fraction of the cost of the ride).
Assumption 1. Throughout the rest of the paper, we focus
on the case where σ ≥ 3/5, i.e., the customers’ preferences
over the two firms are highly correlated. Moreover, we assume
max
i,j
λij ≤ (3σ−1)(3−σ)4(5−3σ) `max as an upper bound on the
maximum cost of a ride in the network. This is justified in
the following remark.
Remark 1. The assumption max
i,j
λij ≤ (3σ−1)(3−σ)4(5−3σ) `max
can be satisfied in practice, especially with electric vehicles.
Observe that the bound is increasing with σ, hence it is tightest
when σ = 3/5. To give numbers with a simple calculation,
consider a network with farthest OD pair of 15 miles and
30 minutes away (with average speed 30mph), σ = 3/5
and `max = $50. An average EV consumes 34kWh energy
to drive for 100 miles. For an average price of electricity
of $0.11 per kWh and a charger with 20kWh charging
speed, the EV charges 10kWh in 30 minutes for $1.1, that
allows for 30 miles of range. If we normalize the cost of
a very expensive EV of $100k over 5 years, we get per
minute operational cost of $0.04. In total, to do the trip and
the rebalancing, the vehicle drives for 30 miles for 1 hour
and charges for 30 minutes. In total, this yields a cost of
90× $0.04 + $1.1 = $4.7 = max
i,j
λij ≤ (3σ−1)(3−σ)4(5−3σ) = $7.5.
Whereas the fuel for gasoline vehicles costs about 4 times more
(around $0.16 per mile), which would yield max
i,j
λij = $8.00.
Next, we relate the optimal prices `mij to the profits generated
by the operator and the consumer surplus.
Proposition 2. With the optimal monopoly prices `mij , the
profits generated per period are:
Pm =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij
4σ`max
(`max(1 + σ)− 2`mij )2. (6)
Moreover, define consumer surplus as the difference between
the price that customers pay and the price that they are willing
to pay. Then, the consumer surplus with the optimal prices is:
CSm =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij
`max(σ
2 + σ + 1)− 3`mij (1 + σ − `
m
ij
`max
)
6σ
.
(7)
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Notice that the
profits in (6) are decreasing as the prices for rides increase.
Thus expensive rides generate less profits compared to the
cheaper rides and it is more beneficial if the optimal dual
variables λmij are small and prices are close to `max(1 +σ)/4.
Thus, the operator has incentive to use more efficient routing
and charging policies so they can lower ride prices as much
as possible. Moreover, by computing ∂CS
m
∂`mij
using (7), one
identifies that lower prices generate higher consumer surplus,
which is an intuitive result.
B. Duopoly Static Planning Problem
We study the duopoly as a game between two firms. At
a high level, the game is described by firm f observing
firm −f ’s prices and solving the optimization problem (3)
(by considering firm −f ’s prices to be `−fij rather than ∞
for the demand function). We consider two competitors with
identical operational costs βt and βc, and study the optimal
pricing strategy when the firms are at an equilibrium. In an
equilibrium, no firm benefits from unilaterally changing the
prices for any number of OD pairs (and as a result the optimal
solution to their static planning problem). Given {`−fij }∀i,j∈M,
the best response of firm f is the best pricing, routing and
charging strategy of f , which is the solution of (3) (with `−fij
instead of ∞ in the demand function). Since the operational
costs and the prices of electricity are identical for both of the
firms, their best response to their competitor’s prices are the
same. As such, it is intuitive that there exists an equilibrium in
which both firms set the prices equal (`fij = `
−f
ij ,∀i, j ∈M),
and we show that this is in fact the case. Such an equilibrium
is commonly referred to as a symmetric duopoly equilibrium.
Furthermore, we show that no asymmetric equilibria can exist
under this setting, i.e., identical firms will not set different
prices for the same OD pair at equilibrium.
5Let the following static planning problem characterize the
state in which both firms serve equal number of customers for
all OD pairs and have identical pricing strategies:
max
xeic,x
e
ij ,`
1
ij
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij`
1
ijD(`
1
ij , `
2
ij)
∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
−
m∑
i=1
emax−1∑
e=0
(βc + pi)x
e
ic
− βt
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
emax∑
e=eij
xeijτij (8a)
subject to θijD(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
≤
emax∑
e=eij
xeij ∀i, j ∈M,
(8b)
(3c)− (3g).
Since there are no constraints on the fleet size and furthermore
prices that control the demand are decision variables, a feasible
solution to the above optimization problem always exists.
Moreover, the optimal solution to (8) specifies an equilibrium
of the duopoly.
Proposition 3. The firms are in an equilibrium when their
routing, charging, and symmetric pricing strategy follows the
solution of (8).
The proof can be found in Appendix C. Accordingly, there
exists a duopoly equilibrium characterized as the optimal
solution of (8), in which the firms set identical prices. The
optimal solution to (8) is however not necessarily unique and
there can be many solutions yielding the same profits. For
instance, if pi = pj ,∀i, j ∈ M, then the optimal charging
strategy is not unique. We let {`dij}i,j∈M to be the optimal
prices determined as an optimal solution of (8) and say that
the firms are in a symmetric duopoly equilibrium as long
as `1ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij ,∀i, j ∈ M. Furthermore, in the next
proposition, we state that if both firms serve all OD pairs,
equilibrium prices can not be asymmetric.
Proposition 4. There exists no asymmetric equilibrium prices,
in which both firms serve nonzero demand for all OD pairs
with nonzero potential demand.
The proof is provided in Appendix D. As we have identified
that the duopoly can only be in a symmetric equilibrium, we
analyze the effects of competition in state of a symmetric
equilibrium.
The next set of results characterize the effects of competition
on the ride prices, the operators’ profits, the total societal ride
demand served, and the consumer surplus. In the first result,
we provide lower and upper bounds on the price reduction the
customers will see with the introduction of the second firm and
moving from a monopoly to a symmetric duopoly equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Let λij be defined as in Proposition 1. Define
∆1(λij) := 4`
2
max+(2λij+(15σ−3)`max)(2λij+(1−σ)`max),
∆2(λij) := 2(σ`max−λij)2+2(`max−λij)2+11(σ−1)2`2max.
Let λdij be the optimal dual variable corresponding to the
demand satisfaction constraint (8b). The optimal symmetric
duopoly prices are determined as:
`dij =

(3−5σ)`max+2λdij+
√
∆1(λdij)
8 ,
λdij
`max
≤ 3(1−σ)22(σ+1)
(5−3σ)`max+2λdij−
√
∆2(λdij)
4 , o.w.,
(9)
Moreover, denote the difference between optimal monopoly
and symmetric duopoly prices for OD pair (i, j) as
∆`ij := `
m
ij − `dij . Then:
∆`ij ≥

(7σ−1)`max−2λij−
√
∆1(λij)
8 ,
λij
`max
≤ 3(1−σ)22(σ+1)
(4σ−4)`max−2λij+
√
∆1(λij)
4 , o.w.
(10)
and
∆`ij ≤ (7σ − 1)`max + 4λij − `max
√−15σ2 + 18σ + 1
8
.
(11)
The proof can be found in Appendix E. An interesting
observation is how σ affects the optimal prices. For the optimal
monopoly prices, ∂`mij/∂σ > 0, i.e., the monopolist serving
a population with higher σ charges more for the rides with
identical costs (i.e., identical λmij ). The reason is that larger σ
means there will be more customers buying a ride at the same
price, since the customers that would prefer the competing
firm now can accept rides fom the monopolist. This increase in
demand allows the monopolist to charge higher prices in order
to balance the induced demand. On the contrary for the optimal
symmetric duopoly prices, ∂`dij/∂σ < 0. That is, the duopoly
serving a population with higher σ charges less for the rides
with identical costs (i.e., identical λdij). The intuition behind
is that larger σ indicates a lack of firm loyalty (when σ = 1,
the customers buy from the firm that offers lower prices).
Hence, higher σ strengthens the competition and causes the
firms to charge less. The reader can observe that when σ = 1,
`dij = λ
d
ij , i.e., the optimal prices are equal to the costs of
providing the rides to the platform, which is the lowest the
firms can go without losing money but make no profit.
Observe that the lower bounds in (10) are decreasing
functions of λij . Given the maximum value of λij equal
to λij =
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) `max, the lower bound on the price
difference is 0. Hence, we can conclude that the duopoly prices
are never higher than the monopoly prices, for all OD pairs.
Proposition 5 characterizes the effect of competition on the
prices depending on the network parameters and therefore the
dual variables. The next series of results aim to determine
universal bounds on the ratio of prices, induced demand,
profits and consumer surplus in the monopoly and the duopoly,
independent of the network parameters.
Corollary 5.1 (Price Bounds). For all OD pairs, the optimal
monopoly prices obey the following:
2`max
5
≤ `m ≤ `mij ≤ `
m ≤ 3`max
4
, (12)
where `m := 1+σ4 `max and `
m
:= 7+14σ−9σ
2
40−24σ `max. Further-
more, the optimal symmetric duopoly prices obey:
0 ≤ `d ≤ `dij ≤ `
d ≤ `max
2
, (13)
where `d := 3−5σ+
√−15σ2+18σ+1
8 `max and `
d
:= 1+σ4 `max.
6Moreover for all OD pairs (i, j), the ratio between the optimal
duopoly and monopoly prices obey the following:
`d
`
m ≤
`dij
`mij
≤ `
d
`m
= 1. (14)
The proof can be found in Appendix F. An observation
is that increasing σ increases both the upper and the lower
bounds for the optimal monopoly prices, whereas decreases
the lower bound on the optimal duopoly prices and increases
the upper bound. This is because for the optimal monopoly
prices, ∂`mij/∂σ > 0. However, because it strengthens the
competition between the firms in the duopoly, it can cause the
prices to go much lower, hence decreasing the lower bound
(when σ = 1: if λdij = 0, then `
d
ij = 0). The upper bound on
the optimal duopoly prices still increases, because according
to Assumption 1 a larger σ permits a larger λdij and hence
higher prices. Consequently, the upper bound on the price
ratio is always 1 independent of σ while the lower bound
is decreasing with σ.
The next result characterizes the effect of competition on the
total customer demand for rides that are served by either firm.
We show that the aggregate demand served by the duopoly
is at least equal to and can be up to 4 times higher than the
demand served by the monopoly.
Proposition 6 (Demand Bounds). For all OD pairs (i, j),
the monopoly demand functions evaluated at the optimal
monopoly prices obey the following:
1
4
≤ Dm ≤ D(`mij ,∞) ≤ D
m ≤ 2
3
, (15)
where Dm := 13−3σ
2−6σ
40σ−24σ2 and D
m
:= 1+σ4σ . The duopoly
demand functions at the optimal duopoly prices obey:
1
4
≤ Dd ≤ D(`dij , `dij) ≤ D
d ≤ 1
2
, (16)
where Dd := 14σ and D
d
:= 12 −
(−(1+σ)+
√−15σ2+18σ+1)2
128σ(1−σ) .
Furthermore, the ratio between the total demand served be-
tween any OD pair
2D(`dij ,`
d
ij)
D(`mij ,∞) obeys the following:
1 ≤ 2
1 + σ
=
2Dd
D
m ≤
2D(`dij , `
d
ij)
D(`mij ,∞)
≤ 2D
d
Dm
≤ 4 (17)
The proof can be found in Appendix G. Taking into account
that induced demand is inversely proportional to prices, the
impact of σ on the demand function bounds is in accordance
with price bounds in Corollary 5.1.
Remark 2. The upper bound in (17) is achieved when σ = 1,
λmij =
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) `max and λ
d
ij = 0. Although it is achievable
for some OD pairs, it is not possible to achieve it for all OD
pairs simultaneously. This is because for λdij to be 0, constraint
(8b) has to be slack, meaning node i has excess supply of
vehicles that are being rebalanced to node j. This however
can not hold simultaneously for all OD pairs, since that would
mean there are empty vehicles being routed between all OD
pairs, which would not be optimal.
Interestingly, we see that this potential increase in the
aggregate demand never translates into a profit increase for the
firms because of the competition. As expected, profits decrease
in the presence of competition. According to the next result,
the profits generated by a single firm in duopoly is always less
than 85% of the profits generated by the monopoly.
Proposition 7 (Profit Bounds). Let profits earned by serving
the induced demand between OD pair (i, j) in the monopoly
be Pmij . With the optimal monopoly prices, P
m
ij for all (i, j)
obey the following:
θij
`max
16
≤ θijPm ≤ Pmij ≤ θijP
m ≤ θij `max
4
, (18)
where
Pm =
(3σ2 + 6σ − 13)2
64σ(5− 3σ)2 `max, P
m
=
(1 + σ)2
16σ
`max.
Similarly, let profits earned by serving the induced demand
between OD pair (i, j) by a single firm in the duopoly be P dij .
With the optimal duopoly prices, P dij for all (i, j) obey:
0 ≤ θijP d ≤ P dij ≤ θijP
d ≤ 4 +
√
10
48
`maxθij (19)
where
P d =
(
`
d − (3σ − 1)(3− σ)
4(5− 3σ) `max
)
×Dd
=
1− σ
2σ(5− 3σ)`max
and
P
d
= `dD
d
Furthermore, for all OD pairs, the ratio
Pdij
Pmij
obeys:
8(1− σ)
(σ + 1)2(5− 3σ) =
P d
P
m ≤
P dij
Pmij
≤ P
d
Pm
/ 0.85. (20)
The proof can be found in Appendix H. Since lower prices
generate more profits in the monopoly and the price bounds
are increasing with σ, the profit bounds of the monopoly are
decreasing with σ. Similarly, the duopoly profit bounds are
decreasing with σ too. Since σ increases the upper bound
on prices, the lower bound on the profits decrease. However,
although σ decreases the lower bound on the prices, the upper
bound on the profits still decrease. This is because unlike
the monopoly, competition in the duopoly is a downward
driving force on the prices. Consequently, lower prices in the
duopoly do not only result from lower λdij , but also stronger
competition. Hence, although lower prices increase the ag-
gregate demand, because the firms are now competing over
the customers, neither of the firms serve enough customers to
compensate for the decrease in the prices. Hence, the profits
decrease.
The upper bound in (20) is achieved when σ = 3/5,
λmij =
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) `max, and λ
d
ij = 0. Due to the same
argument in Remark 2, it can not be achieved simultaneously
by all the OD pairs. Consequently, the ratio of total profits can
not achieve this upper bound with equality.
How do the customers benefit from the introduction of com-
petition? We saw that a reduction in ride prices is expected.
Next, we show that the consumer surplus in the duopolistic
setting is at least equal to and can be up to 16 times the
consumer surplus in the monopoly.
7Proposition 8 (Consumer Surplus Bounds). Let the consumer
surplus of customers requesting a ride between OD pair (i, j)
in the monopoly be CSmij . With the optimal monopoly prices,
CSmij for all (i, j) obey the following:
θij
`max
32
≤ θijCSm ≤ CSmij ≤ θijCS
m ≤ θij 13
90
`max, (21)
where
CSm =
171σ4 − 660σ3 + 1378σ2 − 1748σ + 907
384σ(5− 3σ)2 `max
and
CS
m
=
7σ2 − 2σ + 7
96σ
`max.
Similarly, let the consumer surplus of customers requesting
a ride between OD pair (i, j) in the duopoly be CSdij . With the
optimal duopoly prices, CSdij for all (i, j) obey the following:
θij
`max
8
≤ θijCSd ≤ CSdij ≤ θijCS
d ≤ θij `max
2
, (22)
where
CSd =
σ2 − 2σ + 13
96σ
`max
and
CS
d
=
`max
24σ(1− σ)
(
(2σ)3 − (σ + 1− 2 `
d
`max
)3
− 24σ(1− `
d
`max
)(σ − 1 + `
d
`max
)
)
Furthermore, for all OD pairs, the ratio
CSdij
CSmij
obeys:
1 ≤ σ
2 − 2σ + 13
7σ2 − 2σ + 7 ≤
CSd
CS
m ≤
CSdij
CSmij
≤ CS
d
CSm
≤ 16 (23)
The proof can be found in Appendix I. Considering the
fact that lower prices (both in the duopoly and the monopoly)
increase the consumer surplus by inducing more customers
and increasing the surplus per customer, the dependency of the
price bounds on σ reflects to the consumer surplus bounds.
Remark 2 applies for the upper bound in (23) too, and thus it
can not be achieved for all OD pairs simultaneously. Therefore,
the ratio of total consumer surplus cannot achieve this upper
bound with equality.
So far, we have studied the effects of competition in an
electric AMoD system by adopting a static network-flow for-
mulation. Although very convenient for analysis, this formula-
tion does not reflect the randomness in arrivals nor constrains
vehicles dispatch decisions to be integer valued (e.g., 0.25
customer may be served). To address these discrepancies with
the real environment, in the next section, we modify our model
to account for the randomness in arrivals and furthermore
design a control policy that can be implemented in real-time.
IV. REAL-TIME CONTROL
To accommodate for the stochastic nature of the arrivals,
we model the arrival of the potential customers OD pair (i, j)
as a Poisson process with an arrival rate of θij . Moreover,
we allow the firms to set prices real-time and use the same
price-responsive demand model. In particular, during period
t, for a price tuple (`1ijt, `
2
ijt) for OD pair (i, j), the induced
arrival rate for firm f is given by Θfijt = θijD(`
f
ijt, `
−f
ijt ).
Thus, the number of new ride requests in time period t for firm
f is Afijt ∼ Pois(Θfijt) for OD pair (i, j). As a consequence
of this randomness in the customer arrivals, the platform
operator might not be able to assign every customer to a
ride immediately (if the number of induced arrivals exceed the
number of available vehicles). In order to address this nuance,
we adopt the following ride-sharing model:
Ride Sharing Model: Customers that purchase a ride during
period t are not immediately matched with a ride, but enter
the queue for OD pair (i, j) to be served at the beginning
of period t + 1. After the platform operator executes routing
decisions for the fleet at the beginning of period t + 1, the
customers in the queue for OD pair (i, j) are matched with
rides and served on a first-come, first-served basis.
Under these additional modeling modifications, our goal is
to establish a real-time pricing and fleet management policy
that can be implemented in a real environment. In fact, the
model studied in Section III is the static planning problem
associated with this real environment, where we ignored the
stochasticity of the arrivals and used the expected values, while
allowing the vehicle routing decisions to be flows (real num-
bers) rather than integers. For the monopoly (or the symmetric
duopoly), the solution to this static planning problem in (3) (or
(8)) is the optimal static policy that consists of optimal prices
as well as optimal vehicle routing and charging decisions. This
policy can not directly be implemented in a real environment
because it does not yield integer valued solutions. It is possible
generate integer-valued solutions to be implemented in a real
environment using the fractional flows (e.g., randomizing the
vehicle decisions according to the flows), yet the methodology
is not the focus of our work. Instead, we highlight a sufficient
condition for a realizable policy (generating integer valued
actions) to provide stability according to the feasible solutions
of (3) (or (8)):
Proposition 9. Let {˜`1ij , x˜eij , x˜eic} be a feasible solution of
(3) (or (8)). Let µ be a policy that generates integer actions
and can be implemented in the real environment. Then, µ
guarantees stability of the system if for all OD pairs (i, j):
1) The time average of the induced arrivals equals
D(˜`1ij ,∞) (or D(˜`1ij , ˜`1ij)), and
2) The time average of the routed vehicles equals∑emax
e=eij
x˜eij .
The proof can be found in Appendix J. According to
Proposition 9, for a static pricing policy with the optimal prices
`mij in the monopoly (or `
1
ijt = `
2
ijt = `
d
ij , ∀t in the symmetric
duopoly), there exists an integer-valued routing and charging
policy that maintains stability of the system.
In an earlier work [13], it was shown that randomizing
the vehicle decisions according to the optimal solution of the
static problem meets the criteria highlighted by Proposition 9
and hence guarantees stability. However, considering random
arrivals, this method may not execute the most profitable
actions since it does not take the real-time queue lengths into
consideration. Although it guarantees stability of the queues,
it does not seek to minimize the queue lengths and hence the
wait time of the passengers, which would negatively affect
the business. Instead of using the randomized solution to
8implement real-time actions, it is possible to realize a real-time
policy that acknowledges the queue lengths and hence aims to
maximize the profits while minimizing the total wait time of
the customers. To achieve this, we propose to apply finite-
horizon model predictive control (MPC) in our numerical
experiment (albeit with no performance guarantee). The details
of the MPC procedure can be found in Appendix K.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, we discuss the effects of competition and
the performances of the real-time controllers via numerical
examples. To solve the optimization problems we used the
Gurobi Optimizer [36].
In our discrete-time system, we chose one period to be
equal to ∆t = 5 minutes, which is equal to the time
it takes to deliver one unit of battery energy. We chose
operational costs of βt = $0.2 and βc = $0.1 (by tak-
ing the normalized average price of an electric car over
5 years [37] as a reference), maximum willingness to pay
`max = $50, and σ = 3/5. We chose a maximum battery
capacity of 24kWh, and discretized the battery energy into
emax = 6 units, where one unit of battery energy is 4kWh.
Fig. 2: Manhattan di-
vided into m = 20
regions.
Price of electricity per unit of energy
(4kWh) ranges from $0.32 to $1.2
[38], and we randomly sampled pi
fordifferent locations uniformly from
this range.
For the network and demand data,
we divided Manhattan into 20 regions
as in Figure 2. Using the yellow taxi
data from the New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission dataset [39]
for May 09, 2019, Thursday between
15.00-17.00, we extracted the average
arrival rates for rides, average trip du-
rations, and average distances between
the regions (we excluded the rides oc-
curring in the same region).
A. Effects of Competition Under Static Setting
In this study, we analyze the effects of competition using
prices for rides, induced demand, profits, and consumer surplus
as metrics. To get the values of the aforementioned metrics in
the monopoly, we solved (3). For the duopoly, in order to get
the optimal solution of (8), we computed the best response of
firm f to firm −f ’s prices until convergence. Since we have
shown that the equilibrium prices are symmetric, they indeed
converge to a symmetric equilibrium.
In Figure 3, we plot the competitors’ best response prices for
some rides originating from node 6, by solving (8) iteratively
and alternating between the firms (the initial prices were set as
the optimal monopoly prices). We show that the best response
prices converge in just a couple of iterations.
In Table I, we display the ratios of performance metrics
in the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium.
Moreover, we compute the theoretic upper and lower bounds
derived in Section III for σ = 3/5 for comparison. To
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16
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)
Competitors′ Best Response Prices
Fig. 3: Firms’ best response prices for some rides originating from
node 6.
summarize the table, competition results in a 20% decrease in
the average prices of rides, a 44% increase in the total induced
demand, a 43% decrease in the profits of a single firm, and a
100% increase in the consumer surplus.
Metrics Empirical Theoretic LB Theoretic UB
`davg/`
m
avg 0.80 0.67 1
Dd/Dm 1.44 1.25 2.26
P d/Pm 0.57 0.39 0.85
CSd/CSm 2.00 1.46 5.89
TABLE I: Ratios of average prices, induced demand, profits, and
consumer surplus in the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly
equilibrium for σ = 3/5.
Impact of σ: The correlation over customers’ preferences is
measured by σ, and the effects of competition depend on
the value of σ. To study how σ influences the effects of
competition, we present the ratios of performance metrics
in the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium for
σ = 0.8 and σ = 1 in Table II.
Metrics Empirical Theoretic LB Theoretic UB
σ = 0.8 σ = 1 σ = 0.8 σ = 1 σ = 0.8 σ = 1
`davg/`
m
avg 0.42 0.11 0.29 0 1 1
Dd/Dm 1.73 2.04 1.11 1 2.55 4
P d/Pm 0.32 0 0.19 0 0.74 0
CSd/CSm 2.95 4.18 1.22 1 9.22 16
TABLE II: Ratios of average prices, induced demand, profits, and
consumer surplus in the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly
equilibrium for σ = 0.8 and σ = 1.
The results in Tables I and II indicate that the higher the
σ, the stronger the competition between the firms. A larger
σ indicates higher correlation over customers’ preferences,
which means that the customers care less about the identity
of the firm and more about lower prices when buying a ride
(σ = 1 means they buy from the firm that offers the lower
price). Hence, a stronger competition requires the firms to drop
their prices further, which in turn decreases their profits more.
This is in favor of the customers, since lower prices induce
more demand while generating higher consumer surplus.
B. Real-Time Control
In this study, we demonstrate the performances of the model
predictive controllers utilizing static and dynamic pricing
schemes using profits (minus the queue penalty) and the
average wait time of the customers as metrics. To quantify the
queue penalty, we set queue penalty per person to be w = $4
(we doubled the average hourly wage, which is around $24 in
the United States [40]).
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Fig. 4: MPC results. In (a)/(b), we plot the normalized queue length for the MPC with static prices/MPC with dynamic prices.
We computed the instantaneous profits in one period as:
Profits = Revenue− (Operational + Charging Costs), (24)
the queue penalty in one period as:
Queue Penalty = w × Outstanding Customers, (25)
and used the objective value of (3) as an upper bound on the
average profits for comparison. We define
Normalized Queue Length :=
Outstanding Customers
Induced Demand
(26)
and compute the instantaneous average wait time of customers
in one period as:
Avg. Wait Time = Normalized Queue Length×∆t. (27)
We implemented the MPC with T = 10×∆t as the planning
horizon, and ran the environment for 50×∆t.
1) Monopoly: We ran the simulation for the monopoly. We
plot the instantaneous average wait time for MPC with static
prices (MPC-SP) and dynamic prices (MPC-DP) in Figure 4,
and summarize the results in Table III.
Metrics MPC-SP MPC-DP % Impr.
Mean Profits-Queue Penalty ($) 11700.86 11778.13 0.66%% of static 98.36% 99.02%
Mean Avg. Wait Time (sec) 6.91 5.64 18.38%
Var. Avg. Wait Time (sec) 32.58 20.95 35.7%
TABLE III: MPC results in the monopoly. Mean and variance indicate
the mean and the variance over time. The static objective value is
11894.9.
We observe that both controllers are able to keep the queue
lengths very short (around 2% of the induced demand), and
still generate substantial amount of profits that is close to
the static objective. In particular, MPC-SP generates 98.36%
and MPC-DP generates 99.02% of the static profits, including
the queue penalty. Although the marginal benefits of using
dynamic pricing might seem low, a 0.66% increase in average
profits would make a considerable difference in the long run
(e.g., from Table III, a 77$ increase in profits per period adds
up to more than an increase of 900$ per hour). Moreover, we
observe that the mean of average wait time for MPC-SP is
6.91 seconds, while that of MPC-DP is 5.64 seconds which is
an improvement of 18.38%. Lastly, a dynamic pricing scheme
reduces the variance of the average wait time by 35.7%, which
indicates a more robust system with predictable wait times.
We furthermore generated integer actions by randomizing
according to the flows of the static solution and implemented
the static policy in the real environment to show its perfor-
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Fig. 5: Monopoly Static Policy Queues
mance for comparison. In Figure 5 we plot the average wait
time using the static policy. Although it provides stability of
the queues, it results in bad wait times with a mean of 36.9
minutes, which is more than 300 times longer than both MPC-
SP and MPC-DP.
2) Duopoly: We ran the simulation for the duopoly, and
computed the mean value of the metrics over both firms
to get the performances of the controllers. The results are
summarized in Table IV.
Metrics MPC-SP MPC-DP % Impr.
Mean Profits-Queue Penalty ($) 6670.89 6729.2 0.87%% of static 98.56% 99.42%
Mean Avg. Wait Time (sec) 7.27 5.01 31.08%
Var. Avg. Wait Time (sec) 44.68 17.92 59.89%
TABLE IV: MPC results in the duopoly. Mean and variance indicate
the mean and the variance over time. The static objective value is
6768.2.
Similar to the monopoly, both controllers are able to keep
the queues short while generating profits close to the static ob-
jective, with dynamic pricing scheme increasing the efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the impacts of competition on
electric AMoD systems by comparing the monopoly and the
duopoly in equilibrium. By formalizing the optimal strategies
of profit-maximizing platform operators, we show that the
identical competitors can only be in a symmetric equilibrium.
In state of a symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the prices for
rides and the profits of the firms are always less than those in
the monopolistic setting, whereas the aggregate demand served
and the consumer surplus are always higher. The closed-
form universal bounds we provide quantify the amount of
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increase/reduction on the said metrics. These bounds depend
heavily on correlation between customers’ preferences and
therefore the strength of the competition. The numerical stud-
ies using network and demand data of Manhattan indicate that
stronger competition boosts the amount of increase/reduction
on the metrics. Lastly, we experimentally demonstrate that it
is possible to implement a real-time control policy for fleet
management using model predictive control, and show that a
real-time pricing policy further improves the performance.
As a future direction, it would be interesting to introduce
road and charging station capacity constraints, and hence
study the duopoly in presence of congestion effects. The
competition over charging/parking spots and road links would
result in a more complex game, whose analysis would be more
sophisticated than the one presented in this paper. Another
extension would be to introduce fleet size constraints, which
could potentially lead to asymmetric equilibria.
REFERENCES
[1] (2020) Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics. [Online]. Available:
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/
[2] (2020) 40+ Corporations Working On
Autonomous Vehicles. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/autonomous-driverless-vehicles-corporations-list/
[3] R. Zhang and M. Pavone, “Control of robotic Mobility-on-Demand
systems: A queueing-theoretical perspective,” In Int. Journal of Robotics
Research, vol. 35, no. 1–3, pp. 186–203, 2016.
[4] M. Pavone, S. L. Smith, E. Frazzoli, and D. Rus, “Robotic load balancing
for Mobility-on-Demand systems,” Int. Journal of Robotics Research,
vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 839–854, 2012.
[5] F. Rossi, R. Zhang, Y. Hindy, and M. Pavone, “Routing autonomous
vehicles in congested transportation networks: Structural properties and
coordination algorithms,” Autonomous Robots, vol. 42, no. 7, pp. 1427–
1442, 2018.
[6] M. Volkov, J. Aslam, and D. Rus, “Markov-based redistribution policy
model for future urban mobility networks,” IEEE Conference on Intel-
ligent Transportation Systems, pp. 1906–1911, 09 2012.
[7] R. Zhang, F. Rossi, and M. Pavone, “Model predictive control of
autonomous mobility-on-demand systems,” in 2016 IEEE International
Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), May 2016.
[8] R. Iglesias, F. Rossi, K. Wang, D. Hallac, J. Leskovec, and M. Pavone,
“Data-driven model predictive control of autonomous mobility-on-
demand systems,” in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation (ICRA). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–7.
[9] F. Miao, S. Han, A. M. Hendawi, M. E. Khalefa, J. A. Stankovic,
and G. J. Pappas, “Data-driven distributionally robust vehicle balancing
using dynamic region partitions,” in 2017 ACM/IEEE 8th International
Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, April 2017, pp. 261–272.
[10] M. Tsao, R. Iglesias, and M. Pavone, “Stochastic model predictive
control for autonomous mobility on demand,” in IEEE Conference on
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2018, pp. 3941–3948.
[11] J. Zgraggen, M. Tsao, M. Salazar, M. Schiffer, and M. Pavone, “A
model predictive control scheme for intermodal autonomous mobility-
on-demand,” in 2019 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Confer-
ence (ITSC), 2019, pp. 1953–1960.
[12] S. Wollenstein-Betech, I. C. Paschalidis, and C. G. Cassandras, “Joint
pricing and rebalancing of autonomous mobility-on-demand systems,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.13614, 2020.
[13] B. Turan, R. Pedarsani, and M. Alizadeh, “Dynamic pricing and man-
agement for electric autonomous mobility on demand systems using
reinforcement learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.06962, 2019.
[14] E. Weyl et al., “Imperfect platform competition: A general framework,”
2010.
[15] J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, “Platform competition in two-sided markets,”
J. Eur. Econ. Assoc., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 990–1029, 2003.
[16] M. Armstrong, “Competition in two-sided markets,” The RAND Journal
of Economics, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 668–691, 2006.
[17] M. Armstrong and J. Wright, “Two-sided markets, competitive bottle-
necks and exclusive contracts,” Economic Theory, vol. 32, no. 2, pp.
353–380, 2007.
[18] B. Caillaud and B. Jullien, “Chicken & egg: Competition among
intermediation service providers,” RAND J. Econ., pp. 309–328, 2003.
[19] Y. Dou and D. Wu, “Dynamic platform competition: Optimal pricing and
piggybacking under network effects,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016.
[20] K. Chen and E. Tse, “Dynamic platform competition in two-sided
markets,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 02 2008.
[21] B. Jullien, H. Halaburda, and Y. Yehezkel, “Dynamic competition with
network externalities: Why history matters,” 2016.
[22] C. Van Raalte and H. Webers, “Spatial competition with intermediated
matching,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 477–488, 1998.
[23] T. Kodera et al., “Spatial competition among multiple platforms,”
Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 1561–1525, 2010.
[24] C. Lee, “Dynamics of ride sharing competition,” 2017.
[25] M. Glo¨ss, M. McGregor, and B. Brown, “Designing for labour: uber and
the on-demand mobile workforce,” in Proc. of the 2016 CHI conference
on human factors in computing systems, 2016, pp. 1632–1643.
[26] J. Cramer and A. B. Krueger, “Disruptive change in the taxi business:
The case of uber,” Am Econ Rev, vol. 106, no. 5, pp. 177–82, 2016.
[27] A. Noulas, V. Salnikov, D. Hristova, C. Mascolo, and R. Lambiotte,
“Developing and deploying a taxi price comparison mobile app in the
wild: Insights and challenges,” in IEEE 5th International Conference on
Data Science and Advanced Analytics, 2018, pp. 424–433.
[28] M. McGregor, B. Brown, and M. Glo¨ss, “Disrupting the cab: Uber,
ridesharing and the taxi industry,” J. Peer Prod., no. 6, 2015.
[29] V. Salnikov, R. Lambiotte, A. Noulas, and C. Mascolo, “Openstreetcab:
Exploiting taxi mobility patterns in new york city to reduce commuter
costs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.03021, 2015.
[30] J. Mayer. (2016) Uber Is Not (And Will
Never Be) A Monopoly. [Online]. Available:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2016/02/15/uber-guardian-not-monopoly-ridesharing/
[31] S. Jiang, L. Chen, A. Mislove, and C. Wilson, “On ridesharing competi-
tion and accessibility: Evidence from uber, lyft, and taxi,” in Proceedings
of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, 2018, pp. 863–872.
[32] K. Bimpikis, O. Candogan, and D. Saban, “Spatial pricing in ride-
sharing networks,” Oper. Res., vol. 67, no. 3, pp. 744–769, 2019.
[33] J. C. Castillo, D. Knoepfle, and G. Weyl, “Surge pricing solves the
wild goose chase,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation, 2017, pp. 241–242.
[34] S. Banerjee, C. Riquelme, and R. Johari, “Pricing in ride-share plat-
forms: A queueing-theoretic approach,” Avail. at SSRN 2568258, 2015.
[35] A. Nikzad, “Thickness and competition in ride-sharing markets,” Avail-
able at SSRN 3065672, 2017.
[36] L. Gurobi Optimization, “Gurobi optimizer reference manual,” 2020.
[Online]. Available: http://www.gurobi.com
[37] The average electric car in the US is getting cheaper. [On-
line]. Available: https://qz.com/1695602/the-average-electric-vehicle-is-
getting-cheaper-in-the-us/.
[38] Edmunds. (2019) The True Cost of Pow-
ering an Electric Car. [Online]. Available:
https://www.edmunds.com/fuel-economy/the-true-cost-of-powering-an-electric-car.html
[39] [Online]. Available: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-data.page
[40] United States Average Hourly Wages. [Online]. Available:
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/wages.
[41] J. G. Dai, “On positive harris recurrence of multiclass queueing net-
works: A unified approach via fluid limit models,” Annals of Applied
Probability, vol. 5, pp. 49–77, 1995.
[42] R. Iglesias, F. Rossi, K. Wang, D. Hallac, J. Leskovec, and M. Pavone,
“Data-driven model predictive control of autonomous mobility-on-
demand systems,” in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation (ICRA), 2018, pp. 6019–6025.
11
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For brevity of notation, let βc+pi = Pi. Let λij be the dual
variables corresponding to the demand satisfaction constraints
and µei be the dual variables corresponding to the flow balance
constraints. We can write the dual problem as:
min
λij ,µei
max
`1ij
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θijD(`
1
ij ,∞)
(
`1ij − λij
)
(28a)
subject to λij ≥ 0, (28b)
λij + µ
e
i − µe−eijj − βtτij ≤ 0, (28c)
µei − µe+1i − Pi ≤ 0 ∀i, j, e. (28d)
For fixed λij and µei , the first order optimality condition is:
∂D(`1ij ,∞)
∂`1ij
(`1ij − λij) +D(`1ij ,∞) = 0 (29)
Depending on the region `1ij is in, the demand function
D(`1ij ,∞) has different forms:
D(`1ij ,∞) =

1− (`
1
ij)
2
2`2maxσ(1−σ) ,
`1ij
`max
< (1− σ)
1+σ− 2`
1
ij
`max
2σ , (1− σ) ≤
`1ij
`max
< σ
(1− `
1
ij
`max
)2
2σ(1−σ) , σ ≤
`1ij
`max
≤ 1
(30)
First, suppose that
`1ij
`max
< (1 − σ). Solving for `1ij in (29)
using (30), we get:
`mij =
λij +
√
λ2ij + 6`
2
maxσ(1− σ)
3
. (31)
Furthermore, the second order optimality condition satisfies:
∂2D(`1ij ,∞)
∂(`1ij)
2
(`mij − λij) + 2
∂D(`1ij ,∞)
∂`1ij
∣∣∣∣∣
`1ij=`
m
ij
< 0. (32)
Hence, KKT conditions are satisfied and the optimal primal
solution satisfies the dual solution with optimal dual variables
λmij . By checking the condition `
m
ij ≤ (1− σ)`max using (31),
we get the condition that λmij ≤ 3−5σ2 . The optimal prices for
the regions where
`mij
`max
∈ [1 − σ, σ) and `
m
ij
`max
∈ [σ, 1] are
derived in a similar fashion using the demand functions in
those regions given in (30).
To get the upper bound on prices, we go through the
following algebraic calculations using the constraints. The
inequality (28d) gives:
µ
e−eji
i ≤ ejiPi + µei , (33)
and equivalently:
µ
e−eij
j ≤ eijPj + µej . (34)
The inequalities (28c) and (28b) yield:
µei − µe−eijj − βtτij ≤ 0,
and equivalently:
µej − µe−ejii − βtτji ≤ 0, (35)
Inequalities (33) and (35):
µej ≤ µei + βtτji + ejiPi. (36)
And finally, the constraint (28c):
λij ≤ βτij + µe−eijj − µei
(34)
≤ βtτij + eijPj + µej − µei
(36)
≤ βtτij + eijPj + βτji + ejiPi.
Replacing Pi = pi + βc and rearranging the terms:
λij ≤ βt(τij + τji) + eij(pj + βc) + eji(pi + βc) = λij ,
(37)
where the last equality follows from the definition provided
in the proposition. Hence, we get the desired upper bound on
the prices using the upper bound on the dual variables.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Using Assumption 1, we see that (3−5σ)2 ≤ 0 and
(3−5σ)
2 `max ≤ λmij ≤ maxi,j λij ≤
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) `max ≤ 3σ−12 `max.
Hence, the optimal prices fall in the region
[(1− σ)`max, σ`max), and are given by:
`mij =
(1 + σ)`max + λ
m
ij
4
. (38)
The dual problem with optimal prices in (38) can be written
as:
min
λij ,µei
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij
4σ`max
(
(1 + σ)`max − 2λij
2
)2
(39a)
subject to λij ≥ 0, (39b)
λij + µ
e
i − µe−eijj − βtτij ≤ 0, (39c)
µei − µe+1i − Pi ≤ 0 ∀i, j, e. (39d)
The objective function in (39a) with optimal dual variables,
along with (38) suggests:
Pm =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij
4σ`max
((1 + σ)`max − 2`mij )2,
where profits Pm is the optimal value of the objective function
of both primal and dual problems (Since the demand function
is linear in the specified region, the problem is convex and
KKT conditions are satisfied. Hence, strong duality holds).
Consumer surplus is given by the difference between the
price that customers pay and the price that they are willing to
pay. For OD pair (i, j) the customers with v1 > `mij have a
positive surplus of v1 − `mij and the customers with v1 ≤ `mij
have a zero surplus since they either do not take the ride or
have exactly a valuation of `mij . Since v1 = σx + (1 − σ)y
and x and y are iid uniform random variables in [0, `max],
the consumer surplus for a single unit of potential demand
between OD pairs (i, j) is computed as:∫ `max
0
∫ `max
`m
ij
−(1−σ)y
σ
1
`2max
(σx+ (1− σ)y − `mij )dxdy =
`max(σ
2 + σ + 1)− 3`mij (1 + σ − `
m
ij
`max
)
6σ
.
(40)
The total consumer surplus is then:
CSm
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij
`max(σ
2 + σ + 1)− 3`mij (1 + σ −
`mij
`max
)
6σ
.
(41)
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C. Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove that the firms are in an equilib-
rium, we first follow similar steps as the proof of Propo-
sition 1 and determine the optimal prices. Suppose that
`1ij , `
2
ij ∈
[
1−σ
2 `max, (1− σ)`max
]
. In that region:
D(`1ij , `
2
ij) =
4σ(1− σ − `
1
ij−`2ij
`max
)− ( `
1
ij+`
2
ij
`max
+ σ − 1)2
8σ(1− σ)
(42)
∂D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂`1ij
=
1
`max
−6σ − 2`
1
ij
`max
− 2`
2
ij
`max
+ 2
8σ(1− σ) (43)
∂2D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂(`1ij)
2
=
1
`2max
−2
8σ(1− σ) (44)
Evaluated at `1ij = `
2
ij , the above expressions become:
D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
=
1
2
− (
2`1ij
`max
+ σ − 1)2
8σ(1− σ) (45)
∂D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂`1ij
∣∣∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
=
1
`max
−6σ − 4`
1
ij
`max
+ 2
8σ(1− σ) (46)
For a given λij , the first order optimality condition is:
∂D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂`1ij
∣∣∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
(`1ij−λij)+D(`1ij , `2ij)
∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij
= 0. (47)
We plug equations (45) and (46) into the above expression to
get a quadratic equation in `1ij , which has two solutions. One
of the solutions is infeasible with `1ij < 0. Hence, we get a
unique solution at:
`dij =
(3− 5σ)`max + 2λij +
√
∆1
8
, (48)
where ∆1 = 4`2max+(2λij+(15σ−3)`max)(2λij+(1−σ)`max).
Note that in the region where `1ij = `
2
ij ≤ (1 − σ)`max,
D(`1ij , `
2
ij) is concave and thus we need to check the second
order optimality condition:
∂2D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂(`1ij)
2
(`dij − λij) + 2
∂D(`1ij , `
2
ij)
∂`1ij
∣∣∣∣∣
`1ij=`
2
ij=`
d
ij
< 0.
(49)
By plugging Equations (44), (46), and (48) into the above ex-
pression, one verifies that it holds true. Hence, KKT conditions
are satisfied and the optimal primal solution satisfies the dual
solution with optimal dual variables λdij :
`dij =
(3− 5σ)`max + 2λdij +
√
∆∗1
8
, (50)
where ∆∗1 = 4`
2
max+(2λ
d
ij+(15σ−3)`max)(2λdij+(1−σ)`max).
Since the conjecture was that `dij ∈
[
1−σ
2 `max, (1− σ)`max
]
,
we check:
1− σ
2
`max ≤
(3− 5σ)`max + 2λdij +
√
∆∗1
8
≤ (1− σ)`max,
to get λdij ≤ 3(1−σ)
2
2(1+σ) . For λ
d
ij = 0, (50) evaluates to
(3−5σ)+√−15σ2+18σ+1
8 `max ≥ 1−σ2 `max, hence the prices fall
in the specified region.
Now suppose that `1ij , `
2
ij ∈ ((1−σ)`max, σ+12 `max]. In that
region:
D(`1ij , `
2
ij) =
(1− σ + `
2
ij−`1ij
`max
)(3 + σ − 3`
1
ij+`
2
ij
`max
)
8σ(1− σ) (51)
By following the same steps as before, we get optimal prices
uniquely as:
`dij =
(5− 3σ)`max + 2λdij −
√
∆∗2
4
, (52)
where ∆∗2 = 2(σ`max−λdij)2+2(`max−λdij)2+11(σ−1)2`2max.
By imposing the condition that `dij ∈ ((1−σ)`max, σ+12 `max],
one identifies:
3(1− σ)2
2(1 + σ)
`max < λ
d
ij ≤
3σ + 1
4
`max. (53)
The upper bound on the dual variables is derived identically
to the Proposition 1. Hence according to Assumption 1
λdij ≤ λij ≤
(3σ − 1)(3− σ)
4(5− 3σ) `max <
3σ + 1
2
`max,
is satisfied.
All in all, we get the optimal prices as:
`dij =

(3−5σ)`max+2λdij+
√
∆∗1
8
λdij
`max
≤ 3(σ−1)22(σ+1)
(5−3σ)`max+2λdij−
√
∆∗2
4 o.w.
(54)
We now show that when both firms set prices equal to
{`dij}i,j∈M, they are in an equilibrium. Given firm −f ’s prices
equal to {`dij}i,j∈M, firm f solves the following best response
problem to determine its optimal prices:
max
xeic,x
e
ij ,`
f
ij
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θij`
f
ijD(`
f
ij , `
d
ij)
−
m∑
i=1
emax−1∑
e=0
(βc + pi)x
e
ic
− βt
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
emax∑
e=eij
xeijτij (55a)
subject to θijD(`
f
ij , `
d
ij) ≤
emax∑
e=eij
xeij ∀i, j ∈M, (55b)
(3c)− (3g).
The first order optimality condition states:
∂D(`fij , `
d
ij)
∂`fij
(`fij − λij) +D(`fij , `dij) = 0. (56)
Setting `fij = `
d
ij satisfies the above equation with the
optimal dual variable λdij because `
1
ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij is a solution
to (47) with λij = λdij . Since both firms have the identical best
response problem (55), the first order condition is satisfied for
both when `1ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij ,∀i, j ∈ M, and hence the firms
are in an equilibrium.
D. Proof Of Proposition 4
We show that when `1ij 6= `2ij and both firms serve greater
than zero demand for an OD pair (i, j), the firms cannot be in
equilibrium. We do it by showing that the first order condition
can not hold for both firms simultaneously.
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We let `1ij = `
2
ij +δ`max, and add the following constraints:
• We constrain δ < (1 − σ) (If δ ≥ (1 − σ), then firm 1
does not serve any demand for that OD pair since the
lines depicted on Figure 1a intersect at y = `max).
• We let `1ij + `
2
ij ≥ (1 − σ)`max (Otherwise if
`1ij + `
2
ij = (1− σ)`max − 2 lines depicted in Figure 1a
intersect at x = −2σ . Then both firms can increase their
profits by increasing their prices by , while keeping the
demand same).
• We let `1ij + `
2
ij ≤ (1 + σ)`max (Otherwise, the lines de-
picted in Figure 1a intersect at x ≥ `max, and hence their
prices don’t affect each others’ demand. In that case, the
prices are determined according to the monopoly prices,
which are bounded by σ`max according to Assumption 1
and hence their sum is always bounded by (1 +σ)`max).
Depending on whether `1ij and `
2
ij are greater than (1−σ)`max,
we have different demand functions and hence we study the
following three cases:
Case 1: Let `1ij , `2ij ≤ (1 − σ)`max. For ease of notation,
we define `f :=
`fij
`max
for firm f . When `1, `2 ≤ 1 − σ, the
demand function for firm f is given by:
D(`f , `−f ) =
4σ(1− σ − (`f − `−f ))− (`f + `−f + σ − 1)2
8σ(1− σ)
(57)
∂D(`f , `−f )
∂`f
=
−6σ − 2`f − 2`−f + 2
8σ(1− σ) (58)
Using (57) and `1 − `2 = δ, the demand functions can be
written as:
D(`1, `2) =
4σ(1− σ − δ)− (σ + 2`1 − 1− δ)2
8σ(1− σ) , (59)
D(`2, `1) =
4σ(1− σ + δ)− (σ + 2`1 − 1− δ)2
8σ(1− σ) . (60)
Furthermore, using (58), the derivatives of the demand func-
tions can be written as:
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
=
∂D(`2, `1)
∂`2
=
−6σ − 4`1 + 2 + 2δ
8σ(1− σ) . (61)
In an equilibrium, both firms should satisfy the first order
condition (FOC). We show that the FOC can not hold for
both of the firms. Define λf =
λfij
`max
for firm f and let FOC
for firm 2 hold:
∂D(`2, `1)
∂`2
(`2 − λ2) +D(`2, `1) = 0. (62)
Using (59), (60), and (61), we can rewrite the above equation
as:
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`2 − `1 + `1 − λ1 + λ1 − λ2)
+D(`1, `2)− 4σ(1− σ − δ)
8σ(1− σ) +
4σ(1− σ + δ)
8σ(1− σ)
=
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`1 − λ1) +D(`1, `2) + δ
1− σ
+
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(−δ − (λ2 − λ1)) = 0.
(63)
To proceed, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let |δ| ≤ 1− σ, `1 − `2 = δ, and `1, `2 ≤ 1− σ.
If the prices satisfy the FOC, then the following inequality
holds:
|λ1 − λ2| ≤ (2− σ(3σ − 2))|δ| (64)
Proof. Using (60) and (61), one can write down the FOC for
a given price `−f = `f + δ to get a quadratic equation in `f .
This equation has two solutions, one of which is infeasible.
Hence, we get the optimal price `f as:
`f =
3− 5σ + 2λf − 3δ +
√
∆
8
, (65)
where
∆ = (δ + 2λf + 7σ − 1)2 + 32σ(δ − 2σ + 1).
We compute the change in the optimal price with respect to
the dual variable as:
∂`f
∂λf
=
1
4
(
1 +
δ + 2λf + 7σ − 1√
∆
)
(66)
The goal is to lower bound ∂`f∂λf . In order to do so, we study
how ∂`f∂λf changes with λf and δ. We first observe that
∂2`f
∂λ2f
< 0,
hence the we need to maximize λf in order to minimize
∂`f
∂λf
.
Since `f is constrained to be less than 1−σ, by upper bounding
the expression in (65) we get a bound on λf as:
λf ≤ δ
2 + δ(4− 8σ) + 3(σ − 1)2
2(δ + σ + 1)
(67)
Next, we plug the upper bound on λf to (66) to get an
expression that is only dependent on σ and δ and compute
the partial derivative with respect to δ to get:
∂
∂δ
∂`f
∂λf
< 0,
hence we maximize δ in order to minimize ∂`f∂λf . We set
δ = 1− σ to get:
∂`f
∂λf
≥ 1
2− σ(3σ − 2) . (68)
Above inequality hods for all `f ≤ 1−σ. Since `1, `2 ≤ 1−σ,
this means:∣∣∣ `1 − `2
λ1 − λ2
∣∣∣ ≥ `1 − `2
λ1 − λ2 ≥
1
2− σ(3σ − 2) . (69)
Plugging `1 − `2 = δ concludes the proof.
Going back to (63), we rearrange:
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`1 − λ1) +D(`1, `2)
= − δ
1− σ −
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(−δ − (λ2 − λ1))
Lemma 1≤ − δ
1− σ −
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
1.12δ
= − δ
1− σ − 1.12δ
−6σ − 4`1 + 2 + 2δ
8σ(1− σ)
=
δ
8σ(1− σ) (−8σ + 6.72σ + 4.48`1 − 2.24− 2.24δ)
=
δ
8σ(1− σ) (4.48`1 − 2.24− 1.28σ − 2.24δ)
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`1≤1−σ≤ δ
8σ(1− σ) (2.24− 5.72σ − 2.24δ) < 0, (70)
where we used Lemma 1 with (2− σ(3σ− 2)) ≤ 2.12 (equal
when σ = 3/5). We conclude that FOC for firm 1 does not
hold, hence they can not be in an equilibrium.
Case 2: Let `1, `2 ≥ (1 − σ). In this region, the demand
function and its derivative for firm f can be written as:
D(`f , `−f ) =
(1− σ + (`−f − `f ))(3 + σ − (3`f − `−f ))
8σ(1− σ)
(71)
∂D(`f , `−f )
∂`f
=
−6 + 2σ + 6`f − 2`−f
8σ(1− σ) (72)
Using the above equations and `1 − `2 = δ, we write:
D(`1, `2) =
(1− σ − δ)(3 + σ − 4`2 − 3δ)
8σ(1− σ) , (73)
D(`2, `1) =
(1− σ + δ)(3 + σ − 4`2 − δ)
8σ(1− σ) , (74)
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
=
−6 + 2σ + 4`2 + 6δ
8σ(1− σ) , (75)
∂D(`2, `1)
∂`2
=
−6 + 2σ + 4`2 − 2δ
8σ(1− σ) . (76)
We follow similar steps as in Case 1 to show that FOC for
both firms can not hold. We write the FOC for firm 2:
∂D(`2, `1)
∂`2
(`2 − λ2) +D(`2, `1)
(75),(76)
=
(
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
− 8δ
8σ(1− σ)
)
(`2 − λ2) +D(`2, `1)
(73),(74)
=
(
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
− 8δ
8σ(1− σ)
)
(`2 − λ2)
+D(`1, `2) +
δ(8− 4δ − 8`2)
8σ(1− σ)
=
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`2 − `1 + `1 − λ1 + λ2 − λ2)
− 8δ
8σ(1− σ) (`2 − λ2) +D(`1, `2) +
δ(8− 4δ − 8`2)
8σ(1− σ)
=
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`1 − λ1) +D(`1, `2)− 8δ
8σ(1− σ) (`2 − λ2)
+
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(−δ + λ1 − λ2) + δ(8− 4δ − 8`2)
8σ(1− σ)
= 0
(77)
For the FOC of firm 1 to hold, the following expression has
to be equal to 0:
8δ
8σ(1− σ) (`2 − λ2)−
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(−δ + λ1 − λ2)
− δ(8− 4δ − 8`2)
8σ(1− σ)
(78)
We show that the above expression is always less than zero by
upper bounding it. To proceed, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let |δ| ≤ 1− σ, `1 − `2 = δ, and `1, `2 ≥ 1− σ.
If the prices satisfy the FOC, then the following inequality
holds:
|λ1 − λ2| ≤ 2|δ|
1− 2λ−2σ√
48(1−σ)2+(2λ−2σ)2
, (79)
where
λ =
(3− σ)(3σ − 1)
4(5− 3σ) .
Proof. Using (74) and (76), one can write the FOC for a given
price `−f = `f + δ to get a quadratic equation in `f . This
equation has two solutions, one of which is infeasible. Hence,
we get the optimal price `f as:
`f =
5− 3σ + 3δ + 2λf −
√
∆
4
(80)
where
∆ = (δ − σ − 1 + 2λf )2 + 12(σ − 1)2 + 12δ(δ + 2− 2σ).
Similar to Lemma 1, the goal is to lower bound ∂`f∂λf . It is
computed as:
∂`f
∂λf
=
1
4
(
2− 2(δ + λf − σ − 1)√
∆
)
(81)
In order to minimize the RHS of the above expression, we
study how it depends on the variables it is a function of. We
first identify that
∂2`f
∂λ2f
< 0,
∂
∂δ
∂`f
∂λf
< 0, (82)
and hence ∂`f∂λf is minimized when δ = 1 − σ and
λf =
(3−σ)(3σ−1)
4(5−3σ) . We plug these expressions to
∂`f
∂λf
to get:
∂`f
∂λf
≥ 1
2
1− 2λ− 2σ√
48(1− σ)2 + (2λ− 2σ)2
 , (83)
where λ := (3−σ)(3σ−1)4(5−3σ) .
The above inequality holds for all `f ≥ 1 − σ as long as
the FOC holds, hence this means:∣∣∣ `1 − `2
λ1 − λ2
∣∣∣ ≥ `1 − `2
λ1 − λ2 ≥
1− 2λ−2σ√
48(1−σ)2+(2λ−2σ)2
2
. (84)
Plugging `1 − `2 = δ concludes the proof.
The upper bound (79) in Lemma 2 is decreasing with σ,
and is equal to 4
2+
√
3/283
|δ| for σ = 3/5. Noting that
4
2 +
√
3/283
≈ 1.528 < 1.6
and using (75), we upper bound (78):
8δ
8σ(1− σ) (`2 − λ2)−
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(−δ + λ1 − λ2)
− δ(8− 4δ − 8`2)
8σ(1− σ)
<
δ
8σ(1− σ)
(
8(`2 − λ2)− (8− 4δ − 8`2)
− 0.6(−6 + 2σ + 4`2 + 6δ)
)
(85)
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Given λ2 and δ, `2 is uniquely determined as in (80). We plug
`2 to (85), and conjecture that (85) < 0. That gives:
12.6− 1.2λ2 + 10.6δ − 11.4σ < 3.4
√
∆. (86)
We take the square of both sides, collect terms on LHS, and
re-state the conjecture as:
f(σ, λ2, δ) < 0, (87)
where
f(σ, λ2, δ) =λ2(−44.8λ2 − 71.68δ + 73.6σ + 16)
+ δ(12.8 + 58.88σ − 37.92δ)+
σ(−20.32σ − 32.96) + 8.48
(88)
Our goal is to maximize f(σ, λ2, δ) and show that it is less
than 0. We first identify that ∂f(σ,λ2,δ)∂λ2 > 0, hence f(σ, λ2, δ)
is maximized when λ2 is maximized. We evaluate f(σ, λ2, δ)
at λ2 =
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) . We next identify that
∂f(σ,,δ)
∂δ > 0, hence
set δ = 1− σ to get:
f(σ, λ2, δ) ≤ f(σ, (3σ − 1)(3− σ)
4(5− 3σ) , 1− σ)
= −83.6(−1.41859 + σ)(−1.4 + σ)(−1.4 + 3σ)(σ − 1)
(3σ − 5)2
< 0,
(89)
for σ ∈ [3/5, 1]. Finally, we conclude that f(σ, λ2, δ) < 0,
hence the conjecture was true. Going back, this means that
the final expression in (85) is less than zero, which means the
expression in (78) is less than zero, meaning that the FOC of
firm 1:
∂D(`1, `2)
∂`1
(`1 − λ1) +D(`1, `2) < 0. (90)
Hence, the FOC for firm 1 can not hold, meaning the firms
can not be in an equilibrium.
Case 3: Let `2 ≤ 1 − σ, `1 ≥ 1 − σ. We show by
contradiction that the FOC-satisfying prices can not be δ apart.
We know that if the prices are in equilibrium, FOC holds for
both. The optimal prices are given by (65) and (80) (replacing
δ by −δ) as:
`1 =
5− 3σ − 3δ + 2λ1 −
√
∆1
4
, (91)
`2 =
3− 5σ + 2λ2 − 3δ +
√
∆2
8
, (92)
where
∆1 = (−δ − σ − 1 + 2λ1)2 + 12(σ − 1)2 + 12δ(δ − 2 + 2σ),
and
∆2 = (δ + 2λ2 + 7σ − 1)2 + 32σ(δ − 2σ + 1).
But since `1 = `2 + δ, the following must be true:
3− 5σ + 2λ2 + 5δ +
√
∆2
8
=
5− 3σ − 3δ + 2λ1 −
√
∆1
4
.
(93)
We show that the above equality can not hold by upper
bounding the following function, which is the difference
between the LHS and the RHS of the above equality:
g(λ1, λ2, δ, σ) =
−7 + σ + 11δ + 2λ2 − 4λ1 +
√
∆2 − 2
√
∆1
8
.
(94)
In order to upper bound the above function, we use the
following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let |δ| ≤ 1 − σ and `1 − `2 = δ. If the prices
satisfy the FOC, then the following inequality holds:
|λ1 − λ2| ≥ |δ| (95)
Proof. Given `−f = `f + δ, the optimal prices for firm f
are given by equations (65) and (80), for `f ≤ 1 − σ and
`f > 1 − σ, respectively. Our goal is to upper bound ∂`f∂λf ,
so that we can lower bound the difference between the dual
variables, given that the price difference is δ. In proofs of
Lemmas 1 and 2, we have shown that
∂2`f
∂λ2f
< 0,
∂
∂δ
∂`f
∂λf
< 0,
and hence in order to upper bound ∂`f∂λf , we set λf = 0 and
δ = 0 in equations (66) and (81). That gives:
∂`f
∂λf
≤ 1
4
(
1 +
7σ − 1√−18σ2 + 15σ + 1
)
, `f ≤ 1− σ, (96)
∂`f
∂λf
≤ 1
4
(
2 +
2(σ + 1)√
13σ2 − 22σ + 13
)
, `f > 1− σ (97)
Both of the above equations are increasing with σ, and are
equal to 1 when σ = 1. Hence:
∂`f
∂λf
≤ 1, (98)
or equivalently
∂λf
∂`f
≥ 1. (99)
Since this holds for all `f :∣∣∣λ1 − λ2
`1 − `2
∣∣∣ ≥ λ1 − λ2
`1 − `2 ≥ 1. (100)
Setting `1 − `2 = δ concludes the proof.
Noting that ∂g(λ1,λ2,δ,σ)∂λ2 ≥ 0 and using Lemma 3 with
λ2 ≤ λ1 − δ, we upper bound (94) as:
g(λ1, λ2, σ, δ) ≤ gˆ(λ1, σ, δ)
=
−7 + σ + 9δ − 2λ1 +
√
∆ˆ1 − 2
√
∆2
8
,
(101)
where
∆ˆ1 = (2λ1 − δ + 7σ − 1)2 + 32σ(δ − 2σ + 1).
Our goal is to maximize gˆ over its variables, and show that it
is always less than 0. That would mean that when the prices
are determined by the FOC, the difference between `2 +δ and
`1 is always less than zero, which contradicts with `1−`2 = δ.
We compute the partial derivatives of gˆ with respect to δ and
λ1 to get:
∂gˆ(λ1, σ, δ)
∂λ1
> 0,
∂gˆ(λ1, σ, δ)
∂δ
> 0, (102)
and hence gˆ(λ1, σ, δ) is maximized when δ = 1 − σ and
λ1 =
1
2 (Note that λ1 ≤ (3−σ)(3σ−1)4(5−3σ) ≤ 12 ):
gˆ(λ1, σ, δ) ≤ gˆ(1/2, σ, 1−σ) = −8σ − 1 +
√−32σ2 + 48σ + 1
8
.
(103)
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Finally, we observe that ∂gˆ(1/2,σ,1−σ)∂σ < 0, and hence gˆ is
maximized when σ = 3/5. Evaluated at σ = 3/5:
gˆ(1/2, 3/5, 2/5) =
√
457− 29
40
< 0. (104)
Hence, with the FOC satisfying prices, `2 + δ is always less
than `1, which is a contradiction. This means that FOC can not
hold for both firms and thus they can not be in an equilibrium.
We have shown that given δ > 0, the FOC can not hold for
both of the firms in none of the cases. Hence, the only case
when FOC holds for both of the firms is when δ = 0, i.e.,
`1 = `2. Therefore asymmetric equilibria can not exist.
E. Proof of Proposition 5
The optimal symmetric duopoly prices are determined in
the proof of Proposition 3 (in Appendix C) as:
`dij =

(3−5σ)`max+2λdij+
√
∆∗1
8
λdij
`max
≤ 3(σ−1)22(σ+1)
(5−3σ)`max+2λdij−
√
∆∗2
4 o.w.
, (105)
where
∆∗1 = 4`
2
max + (2λ
d
ij + (15σ − 3)`max)(2λdij + (1− σ)`max)
and
∆∗2 = 2(σ`max − λdij)2 + 2(`max − λdij)2 + 11(σ − 1)2`2max.
Both equations in (105) are decreasing functions of λdij . In
order to lower bound the difference between the monopoly
prices and the duopoly prices, we lower bound the monopoly
prices by setting λmij = 0 and upper bound the duopoly prices
by setting λdij = λij . In order to upper bound the difference,
we upper bound the monopoly prices by setting λmij = λij and
lower bound the duopoly prices by setting λdij = 0.
F. Proof of Corollary 5.1
Using λmij ≤ λij ≤ max
i,j
λij ≤ (3σ−1)(3−σ)4(5−3σ) `max and
λmij ≥ 0, (4) and (5) give:
(1 + σ)`max
4
≤ `mij ≤
7 + 14σ − 9σ2
40− 24σ `max. (106)
Furthermore since σ ∈ [3/5, 1]; 25 ≤ 1+σ4 and 7+14σ−9σ
2
40−24σ ≤ 34 ,
which completes the part for bounds on monopoly prices. The
bounds on duopoly prices is identical using equations in (54).
According to the definitions of `m, `
m
, `d, and `
d
, the
bounds on the ratio of prices is:
`d
`
m ≤
`dij
`mij
≤ `
d
`m
. (107)
By plugging in the expressions of `m, `
m
, `d, and `
d
we get
the desired inequality.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
From (30), the demand function of the monopoly with the
optimal prices is:
D(`mij ,∞) =
1 + σ − 2`
m
ij
`max
2σ
, (108)
since `mij ∈ [(1 − σ)`max, σ`max] under Assumption 1. Plug-
ging in the expressions for `m and `
m
and imposing the
condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired bounds on (15).
The duopoly demand function for `dij = `
d is given by (45)
as:
D
d
= D(`d, `d) =
1
2
− (
2`d
`max
+ σ − 1)2
8σ(1− σ) , (109)
since `d ≤ (1 − σ)`max. The duopoly demand function for
`dij = `
d
is given by (51) as:
Dd = D(`
d
, `
d
) =
3 + σ − 4 `d`max
8σ
, (110)
since `
d ≥ (1 − σ)`max. By plugging in the expressions for
`d and `
d
and imposing the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the
desired inequalities in (16).
According to the definitions of Dm, D
m
, Dd, and D
d
, the
bounds on the ratio of demand functions is:
Dd
D
m ≤
Dd
Dm
≤ D
d
Dm
. (111)
By plugging in the expressions of Dm, D
m
, Dd, and D
d
and
using the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired inequality
in (17).
H. Proof of Proposition 7
The total profits generated in monopoly is given by (6).
Accordingly, the profits earned by serving the induced demand
between OD pair (i, j) is:
Pmij =
θij
4σ`max
(`max(1 + σ)− 2`mij )2 (112)
Furthermore, lower optimal monopoly prices generate
higher profits according to (6). Hence, the upper bound on
Pmij is given by:
θij
4σ`max
(`max(1 + σ)− 2`m)2 = θij (1 + σ)
2
16σ
= θijP
m
,
(113)
To get the lower bound, we evaluate (112) at `mij = `
m
. By
using the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired inequality
in (18).
For the profits generated in duopoly, we first show that lower
optimal duopoly prices generate higher profits. Since (8) bears
a similar form to (3), the dual objective with the optimal prices
and dual variables can be written as (similar to (28a)):
P d =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
θijD(`
d
ij , `
d
ij)
(
`dij − λdij
)
=
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
P dij ,
(114)
where we define
P dij = θijD(`
d
ij , `
d
ij)
(
`dij − λdij
)
(115)
to be profits earned by serving the induced demand between
OD pair (i, j). By taking the derivative of P dij with respect to
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`dij :
dP dij
d`dij
= θij
(
dD(`dij , `
d
ij)
d`dij
(
`dij − λdij
)
+D(`dij , `
d
ij)(1−
dλdij
d`dij
)
)
(116)
From (54),
d`dij
dλdij
≤ 1. Hence, dλ
d
ij
d`dij
≥ 1. Furthermore, `dij ≥ λdij
according to (54). Finally from (45) and (51) (evaluated at
`1ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij),
dD(`dij ,`
d
ij)
d`dij
≤ 0. All in all that gives:
dP dij
d`dij
≤ 0,
which means lower optimal duopoly prices generate higher
profits. In order to get the upper bound, we evaluate (115) at
`dij = `
d (and λdij = 0 in this case)
2. To get the lower bound,
we evaluate (115) at `dij = `
d
(and λdij =
(3σ−1)(3−σ)
4(5−3σ) `max in
this case)3. To get the desired inequality at (19), we impose
σ ∈ [3/5, 1].
According to the definitions of Pm, P
m
, P d, and P
d
, the
bounds on the ratio of profits earned by serving the induced
demand for OD pair (i, j) is:
P d
P
m ≤
P dij
Pmij
≤ P
d
Pm
. (117)
By plugging in the expressions of Pm, P
m
, P d, and P
d
and
using the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired inequality
in (20).
I. Proof of Proposition 8
The consumer surplus in monopoly is given by (7). Ac-
cordingly, the consumer surplus of customers requesting a ride
between OD pair (i, j) is:
CSmij = θij
`max(σ
2 + σ + 1)− 3`mij (1 + σ −
`mij
`max
)
6σ
, (118)
Observe that
∂CSmij
∂`mij
= θij
6
`mij
`max
−3σ−3
6σ ≤ 0 for
`mij ∈ [(1 − σ)`max, σ`max]. Hence, lower optimal
monopoly prices generate higher consumer surplus. Since
`mij ≥ `m = 1+σ4 `max, the upper bound on CSmij is given
by:
θij
`max(σ
2 + σ + 1)− 3`max 1+σ4 (1 + σ − 1+σ4 )
6σ
= θij
7σ2 − 2σ + 7
96σ
`max = θijCS
m
. (119)
Similarly, the lower bound on the consumer surplus is given
by evaluating (118) at `mij = `
m
= 7+14σ−9σ
2
40−24σ `max. By using
the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired inequality in
(21).
2When `1ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij = `
d ≤ (1 − σ)`max, (8) is not a convex
optimization problem (since the demand function is concave in that region).
Hence, strong duality might not hold. However, since we are computing an
upper bound on the objective function, the objective value of (8) is always
less than or equal to the objective value of the dual problem given by (114),
due to weak duality. Hence, the upper bound holds and is tight when strong
duality holds.
3When `1ij = `
2
ij = `
d
ij = `
d ≥ (1−σ)`max, (8) is a convex optimization
problem since the demand function is linear in that region. Hence, strong
duality holds and the value of (114) is equal to the objective value of (8).
Similar to the monopoly, lower duopoly prices gen-
erate higher consumer surplus by inducing more cus-
tomers and generating higher surplus per customer. For
`dij = `
d ≤ (1 − σ)`max, the upper bound on the consumer
surplus of customers requesting a ride between OD pair (i, j)
is computed as:
2θij
(∫ `d1−σ
`max
2
∫ `max
`d−(1−σ)y
σ
(σx+ (1− σ)y − `d)dxdy
+
∫ `max
`d
1−σ
∫ `max
0
(σx+ (1− σ)y − `d)dxdy
)
=
θij`max
24σ(1− σ)
(
(2σ)3 − (σ + 1− 2 `
d
`max
)3
− 24σ(1− `
d
`max
)(σ − 1 + `
d
`max
)
)
= θijCS
d
.
(120)
where the factor 2 is due to the symmetry of two firms.
For `dij = `
d
= 1+σ4 `max ≥ (1 − σ)`max, the lower bound
is computed as:
2θij
∫ `max
`max
2
∫ `max
`d−(1−σ)y
σ
(σx+ (1− σ)y − `d)dxdy
= θij
σ2 − 2σ + 13
96σ
`max = θijCSd
(121)
By using the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired
inequality in (22).
According to the definitions of CSm,CS
m
,CSd, and CS
d
,
the bounds on the ratio of consumer surplus of customers
requesting ride between OD pair (i, j) is:
CSd
CS
m ≤
CSdij
CSmij
≤ CS
d
CSm
. (122)
By plugging in the expressions of CSm,CS
m
,CSd, and CS
d
and using the condition σ ∈ [3/5, 1], we get the desired
inequality in (23).
J. Proof of Proposition 9
We prove Proposition 9 for the monopoly and the proof
is identical for the symmetric duopoly. To prove Proposition
9, we first formulate the static optimization problem via a
network flow model that characterizes the capacity region of
the network for a given set of prices `1ij(t) = `
1
ij ∀t (Hence,
Θij(t) = Θij ∀t). The capacity region is defined as the set
of all arrival rates [Λij ]i,j∈M, where there exists a charging
and routing policy under which the queueing network of the
system is stable. Let xei be the number of vehicles available at
node i, αeij be the fraction of vehicles at node i with energy
level v being routed to node j, and αeic be the fraction of
vehicles charging at node i starting with energy level v. We
say the static vehicle allocation for node i and energy level v
is feasible if αeic +
∑
j∈M
j 6=i
αeij ≤ 1.
The optimization problem that characterizes the capacity
region of the network ensures that the total number of vehicles
routed from i to j is at least as large as the nominal arrival
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rate to the queue (i, j). Namely, the vehicle allocation problem
can be formulated as follows:
min
xei ,α
e
ij ,α
e
ic
ρ (123a)
subject to Θij ≤
emax∑
e=eij
xeiα
e
ij ∀i, j ∈M, (123b)
ρ ≥ αeic +
∑
j∈M
j 6=i
αeij ∀i ∈M, ∀e ∈ E , (123c)
xei = x
e−1
i α
e−1
ic
+
∑
j∈M
x
e+eji
i α
e+eji
ji ∀i ∈M, ∀e ∈ E ,
(123d)
αemaxic = 0 ∀i ∈M, (123e)
αeij = 0 ∀e < eij , ∀i, j ∈M (123f)
xei ≥ 0, αeij ≥ 0 αeic ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈M, ∀e ∈ E ,
(123g)
xei = α
e
ic = α
e
ij = 0 ∀e /∈ E , ∀i, j ∈M.
(123h)
The constraint (123c) upper bounds the allocation of ve-
hicles for each node i and energy level v. The constraints
(123d)-(123f) are similar to those of optimization problem (3)
with xei = x
e
ic +
∑
j∈M x
e
ij , α
e
ic = x
e
ic/x
e
i , and α
e
ij = x
e
ij/x
e
i .
Lemma 4. Let the optimal value of (123) be ρ∗. Then, ρ∗ ≤ 1
is a necessary and sufficient condition of rate stability of the
system under some routing and charging policy.
Proof. Consider the fluid scaling of the queueing network,
Qrtij =
qij(brtc)
r (see [41] for more discussion on the stability
of fluid models), and let Qtij be the corresponding fluid limit.
The fluid model dynamics is as follows:
Qtij = Q
0
ij +A
t
ij −Xtij ,
where Atij is the total number of riders from node i to node
j that have arrived to the network until time t and Xtij is
the total number of vehicles routed from node i to j up to
time t. Suppose that ρ∗ > 1 and there exists a policy under
which for all t ≥ 0 and for all origin-destination pairs (i, j),
Qtij = 0. Pick a point t1, where Q
t1
ij is differentiable for
all (i, j). Then, for all (i, j), Q˙t1ij = 0. Since A˙
t1
ij = Θij ,
this implies X˙t1ij = Θij . On the other hand, X˙
t1
ij is the total
number of vehicles routed from i to j at t1. This implies
Θij =
∑emax
e=eij
xeiα
e
ij for all (i, j) and there exists α
e
ij and α
e
ic
at time t1 such that the flow balance constraints hold and the
allocation vector [αeij α
e
ic] is feasible, i.e. α
e
ic+
∑m
j=1
j 6=i
αeij ≤ 1.
This contradicts ρ∗ > 1.
Now suppose ρ∗ ≤ 1 and α∗ = [αe∗ij αe∗ic ] is an allo-
cation vector that solves the static problem. The cumulative
number of vehicles routed from node i to j up to time t is
Stij =
∑emax
e=eij
xeiα
e
ijt =
∑emax
e=0 x
e
iα
e
ijt ≥ Θijt. Suppose that
for some origin-destination pair (i, j), the queue Qt1ij ≥  > 0
for some positive t1 and . By continuity of the fluid limit,
there exists t0 ∈ (0, t1) such that Qt0ij = /2 and Qtij > 0
for t ∈ [t0, t1]. Then, Q˙tij > 0 implies Θij >
∑emax
e=eij
xeiα
e
ij ,
which is a contradiction.
By Lemma 4, the capacity region CΛ of the network is
the set of all Θij ∈ R+ for which the corresponding optimal
solution to the optimization problem (123) satisfies ρ∗ ≤ 1.
As long as ρ∗ ≤ 1, there exists a routing and charging policy
such that the queues will be bounded away from infinity.
The platform operator’s goal is to maximize its profits by
setting prices and making routing and charging decisions such
that the system remains stable. In its most general form, the
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
`1ij ,x
e
i ,α
e
ij ,α
e
ic
U(Θij(`
1
ij), x
e
i , α
e
ij , α
e
ic)
subject to [Θij(`1ij)]i,j∈M ∈ CΛ,
(124)
where U(·) is the utility function that depends on the prices,
demand for rides and the vehicle decisions.
Recall that xeic = x
e
iα
e
ic and x
e
ij = x
e
iα
e
ij . Using these
variables and noting that αeic +
∑
j∈M α
e
ij = 1 when ρ
∗ ≤ 1,
the platform operator’s profit maximization problem can be
stated as (3). A feasible solution of (3) guarantees rate stability
of the system, since the corresponding vehicle allocation
problem (123) has solution ρ∗ ≤ 1.
K. Model Predictive Control Procedure
The idea of finite-horizon MPC is to observe the current
state of the environment and determine the best control strat-
egy for a planning horizon of T by predicting the state path
of the environment. Then, only the control strategy at the
initial time period is implemented and the process is repeated.
Specifically, let S be the state of the vehicles (locations, energy
levels) and {Qij}i,j∈M be the outstanding customer demand
(i.e., people who have requested a ride but not yet served)
at the beginning of planning time. The MPC Algorithm is
summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1: MPC Procedure
1: S ← Get vehicle states (locations, energy levels)
2: Qij ← Count outstanding customers
3: {xeijt, xeict, (`ijt)}∀i,j,e,t ← Solve (125) (or (126))
4: Execute {xeij0, xeic0, (`ij0)}∀i,j,e
At each time period, Algorithm 1 is run and the system
state is observed. Using this information, the optimal fleet
management (and pricing) strategy is computed for the next T
periods by solving (125) (or (126)). Vehicle routing/charging
(and pricing) decisions are executed for the initial time period
and the environment transitions into next state. Then, Algo-
rithm 1 is re-run and this process is repeated during the entire
operation of the system.
Next, we state the optimization problems (125)/(126) for
the two controllers using a static/dynamic pricing scheme.
1) MPC Optimization Problem With Static Prices: To state
the MPC optimization problem with static prices, we adopt
a similar formulation studied in [42] and include it here for
completeness. We let xeijt be the number of vehicles at node i
with energy level e being routed to node j in period t, xeict be
the number of vehicles charging at node i starting with energy
level e in period t, and qijt be the people waiting in the queue
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for OD pair (i, j) in period t. We state the problem as follows:
min
xeict,x
e
ijt,qijt
∑
ijt
wijtqijt + βt
∑
ijet
τijx
e
ijt
+
∑
iet
(βc + pi)x
t
ic (125a)
subject to qijt0 ≥ Qij −
∑
e
xeijt0 , ∀i, j ∈M (125b)
qijt ≥ qijt−1 + Θij −
∑
e
xeijt,
∀i, j ∈M, ∀t > t0, (125c)∑
j
xeijt + x
e
ict −
∑
j
x
e+eji
jit−τji − xe−1ict−1 = seit,
∀i ∈M, ∀e ∈ E , ∀t ≥ t0 (125d)
xemaxict = 0, ∀i ∈M, ∀t ≥ t0, (125e)
xeijt = 0, ∀e < eij ,∀i, j ∈M,∀t ≥ t0
(125f)
xeijt, x
e
ict, qijt ≥ 0, xeijt, xeict ∈ N,
∀i, j ∈M, ∀e ∈ E , ∀t ≥ t0 (125g)
xeijt = x
e
ict = 0,∀e /∈ E ,∀t < t0,∀i, j ∈M.
(125h)
Θij in (125c) is the expected value of the induced demand for
OD pair (i, j), which is equal to θijD(`mij ,∞) in the monopoly
and θijD(`dij , `
d
ij) in the symmetric duopoly with the optimal
static prices. The state variable seit denotes the number of
vehicles at node i with energy level e, at the beginning of
time period t. At the beginning of the planning time t = t0,
seit0 is simply the number of available vehicles at node i with
energy level e. For t > t0, seit denotes the number of vehicles
that will be available at the beginning of time period t, at
node i with energy level e. These are the vehicles that are en
route to another node at the time of planning. Hence, (125d)
is the vehicle balance constraint. The constraints (125c) along
with the non-negativity constraint (125g), implement the queue
length transition qijt = max{0, qijt−1 + Θij −
∑
e x
e
ijt} as
two linear inequalities so that (125) can be solved as a linear
program. For t = t0, the queue length is modified via (125b),
where Qij denotes the number of passengers waiting to be
served at the planning time. Qij includes the customers in the
queue and the induced arrivals during the last time period,
in order to allow the initial vehicle routing decisions to be
made after observing the induced arrivals (i.e., at time t = t0,
Qij = qijt0−1 + Aijt0−1, where Aijt0−1 ∼ Pois(Θij)). The
rest of the constraints determine the feasible set and restrict
vehicle routing/charging decisions to be integers.
The first term in the objective function (125a) assigns a
cost to the queue lengths, where wijt is the cost per person in
the queue for OD pair (i, j) at the time period t. The second
term is the operational costs of the trip-making vehicles, and
the last term is the operational and the charging costs of the
charging vehicles.
2) MPC Optimization Problem With Dynamic Prices:
For the dynamic pricing scheme, we state the optimization
problems separately for the monopoly and the duopoly.
a) Monopoly: With a slight modification to (125), we
state the monopoly MPC optimization problem with dynamic
prices as follows:
max
xeict,x
e
ijt,qijt,`
1
ijt
∑
ijt
`1ijtθijD(`
1
ijt,∞)−
∑
ijt
wijtqijt
− βt
∑
ijet
τijx
e
ijt −
∑
iet
(βc + pi)x
t
ic (126a)
subject to qij0 ≥ Qij −
∑
e
xeij0, ∀i, j ∈M
(126b)
qijt ≥ qijt−1 + θijD(`1ijt−1,∞)−
∑
e
xeijt,
∀i, j ∈M, ∀t > t0, (126c)
(125d)− (125h).
This problem bears the same form as (125), with two differ-
ences: 1) The objective function aims to maximize the profits,
where the profits is calculated by revenue minus costs, and
2) The induced arrival rate depends on the real-time prices
(during period t, the induced arrival rate is θijD(`1ijt,∞)
rather than θijD(`mij ,∞) for OD pair (i, j)).
b) Duopoly: One possible way to model the real-time
duopoly pricing is an alternating-move duopoly game. Specif-
ically, every even t0, firm 1 sets new prices and executes
fleet decisions, whereas firm 2 only executes fleet decisions
while keeping prices same as the previous time period. Every
odd t0, firm 2 sets new prices and executes fleet decisions,
whereas firm 1 only executes fleet decisions while keeping
prices same as the previous time period. Furthermore, every
even t0, firm 1 is able to observe firm 2’s prices at the planning
time, however, the future prices of firm 2 depend on firm 2’s
future states, which is unavailable to firm 1. Every odd t0
however, since firm 2 will set the prices, firm 1 is oblivious to
what firm 2’s prices will be, including the planning time. One
possible way of planning for these uncertainties would be to
assume that firm 2’s unknown prices would be the optimal
symmetric duopoly prices and determine the best strategy
accordingly. In respect to these modeling specifications, we
can formulate MPC optimization problem with dynamic prices
in the duopoly with slight modifications to (126). In particular,
every even t0 firm 1 solves (126) with
D(`1ijt0 ,∞)← D(`1ijt0 , `2ijt0), (127)
D(`1ijt,∞)← D(`1ijt, `dij), ∀t > t0, (128)
`1ijt = `
1
ijt−1, ∀i, j ∈M, ∀t = t0 + 2k − 1, k ∈ Z+,
(129)
where `2ijt0 = `
2
ijt0−1. Every odd t0, firm 1 solves (126) with
D(`1ijt,∞)← D(`1ijt, `dij), ∀t ≥ t0 (130)
`1ijt = `
1
ijt−1, ∀i, j ∈M, ∀t = t0 + 2k − 2, k ∈ Z+.
(131)
The same method is applied for firm 2 with odd/even t
switched.
